A key dimension of fiscal policy during the financial crisis was massive government support for the banking system. The macroeconomic effects of that support have, so far, received little attention in the literature. This paper fills this gap, using a quantitative dynamic model with a banking sector. Our results suggest that state aid for banks may have a strong positive effect on real activity. Bank state aid multipliers are in the same range as conventional fiscal spending multipliers. Support for banks has a positive effect on investment, while a rise in government purchases crowds out investment.
I. Introduction
The recent financial crisis has led to an intense debate about the efficacy of fiscal stimulus.
This debate centers on temporary increases in government purchases and social transfers, and on tax cuts. See, e.g., Thorsten Drautzburg and Harald Uhlig (2010) , Lorenzo Forni and Massimiliano Pisani (2011) , Eric Leeper, Nora Traum and Todd Walker (2011) and Günter Coenen et al. (2012) for model-based evaluations of these standard fiscal policy instruments, However, a key aspect of fiscal policy in the crisis was massive government support for the banking system, e.g., in the form of purchases of bank assets and of bank recapitalizations by governments. In several countries, these 'unconventional' fiscal interventions were larger than the changes in standard fiscal instruments, during the crisis. Surprisingly, the macroeconomic effects of these bank support measures have, so far, received little attention in the literature. Our paper seeks to fill this gap, using a quantitative dynamic general equilibrium model with a banking sector. In our economy, bank capital is an important state variable. We model government support for the banking system as a transfer to banks that is financed by higher taxes. State aid to banks boosts bank capital, and it lowers the spread between the bank lending rate and the deposit rate, which stimulates investment and output. Investment drops sharply in financial crises. Thus, government support for banks helps to stabilize a component of aggregate demand that is especially adversely affected by financial crises. By contrast, many conventional fiscal stimulus measures (e.g., government purchases of goods and services) crowd out investment. The GDP multiplier of state aid to banking is in the same range as conventional government spending multipliers.
II. Fiscal Measures in the Global Financial Crisis
Conventional fiscal stimulus (increases in government purchases and social transfers; tax cuts) amounted to 1.98% [1.77%] of US GDP in 2009 . In the European Union (EU), conventional stimulus represented 0.83% [0.73%] of GDP in 2009 [0.73%] of GDP in [2010 . US and EU bank rescue measures mainly occurred in 2009. In the US, government-funded purchases of bank assets and bank recapitalizations represented 1.6% and 3.1% of GDP, respectively, in 2009.
In the EU, asset purchases and recapitalizations represented 2.8% and 1.9% of GDP, respectively, also in 2009. In both the US and the EU, these two types of bank support measures thus amounted to 4.7% of GDP, in 2009. (See Jan in't Veld and and Luc Laeven and Fabian Valencia (2011) .)
III. The Model
We provide intuition about the macroeconomic effects of state aid to banking, using an default, the government may purchase maturing loans from the bank, at face value--t S then is the difference between the face value and the fair value of the loans.) The bank's period t budget constraint is:
(1)
T is a lump-sum tax, while 
A linear approximation of (2) gives: 
B. Model Solution and Calibration
We use a linear approximation to solve the model and calibrate it to quarterly US data . The steady state bank capital ratio is set at 5%. Steady state excess bank capital is zero.
The steady state deposit and loan rates are set 1.28% and 3.44% per annum (p.a.), respectively, and the steady state ratio of loans to annual GDP is set at 50%. We set ''(0) 
IV. Policy Experiments
We discuss transitory state aid for the bank, and compare it to a rise in government purchases.
A. Transitory Government Support to Bank (Table 1)
We consider a transfer to the bank during year 1, by 1% of steady state annual GDP (distributed equally over 4 quarters). Table) rise because of the negative wealth effect of the higher tax paid by the worker, and because the rise in the deposit rate (see below) creates an incentive to work harder. In year 1, hours and GDP rise by 1.56% and 1.17%, respectively. There is also a noticeable positive effect on real activity in subsequent years (GDP rises by 0.83% and 0.29% in years 2 and 4). Investment rises by 6.01% during the first year. Aggregate consumption falls initially (but rises after year 2).
In order to smooth her consumption, the banker responds to the government transfer by saving more-thus bank capital increases. The bank capital ratio rises by 1.10 [1.47] percentage points during the first [second] year. The capital ratio then slowly reverts to its unshocked path. The rise in bank capital leads to a sizable and persistent fall in the lending rate spread, due to a fall in the marginal benefit of excess capital (see equation (3)): -25 basis points (bp) p.a. in year 1. The fall in the loan spread is accompanied by a sizable expansion of loans and deposits. The deposit rate rises noticeably (+34 bp in year 1). The loan rate rises slightly at first (+9 bp in year 1), and then falls below its pre-shock value (-9 bp in year 4).
(The initial loan rate rise is due to the strong increase in employment that raises the marginal product of capital and investment demand; model versions with capital adjustment costs generate a fall in the loan rate, on impact.)
The macroeconomic efficacy of state bank aid hinges on its ability to lower the lending spread. Panel B of Table 1 considers a model variant without an operative bank capital requirement ( '' 0). φ = In that variant, the state aid measure has a much weaker effect on real activity; output only rises by 0.18% in year 1. Bank capital rises, in response to the transfer. However, the loan rate spread is unaffected, as the marginal benefit of excess bank capital does not change. This explains why loans increase much less than in the baseline model variant, and why interest rate responses too are much more muted (the loan and deposit rates rise by merely 2bp in year 1). Hence, the worker has a much weaker incentive to work more.
B. Transitory Increase in Government Purchases (Table 2)
We next discuss the effect of a rise in government output purchases in year 1, by 1% of annual GDP (spread evenly over 4 quarters). In the baseline model, the rise in government purchases crowds out consumption and investment in year 1 (see Table 2 , Panel A). The worker responds to the fall in her after tax income by increasing working hours (+0.57% in year 1), and there is a modest increase in output (+0.39%). The loan rate and the deposit rate rise slightly. Deposits and loans fall, as the worker saves less to smooth her consumption (given the transitory tax increase), and as investment falls. Bank capital rises slightly, but the loan rate spread is hardly affected. The model variant without an operative capital requirement ( '' 0) φ = generates responses to the government purchases shock that are very similar to those predicted by the baseline model (Table 2 , Panel B). These responses are also similar to those generated by RBC models without banks. Hence, the presence of the bank does not significantly affect the transmission of government purchases shocks, essentially because those shocks do not greatly affect bank capital (in contrast to state bank aid).
V. A Richer New Keynesian Policy Model
The results above are robust to a range of alternative model settings. in´t build a bank into a New Keynesian policy model with sticky prices and wages. Their specification of the bank capital requirement is identical to that in the baseline RBC model above. In contrast to the RBC model, the policy model assumes that banks are owned by entrepreneurs. It also features residential investment and mortgage lending to collateral constrained households. As in other policy models, capital and labor adjustment costs and variable capital utilization rates are assumed in order to improve the empirical fit of the model. Because of these features, the New Keynesian policy model is a good alternative for assessing the robustness of the state bank aid multiplier.
In the policy model, the bank support measure raises GDP by 0.97% in year 1 (Table   3 , Panel A). The initial GDP response is thus in the same range as in the baseline RBC structure-however, in the policy model the stimulative effect on GDP is limited to year 1.
On impact, the bank capital ratio rises (+0.46 percentage points in year 1), and the loan rate spread falls hence (-10 bp in year 1), but the boost to the capital ratio is short-lived (capital ratio in year 2: +0.05 percentage points), which helps to understand why the stimulus to real activity is short-lived too. 3 Interestingly, the GDP increase in year 1 is mainly driven by a strong rise in aggregate consumption, +0.99% in year 1. Investment increases in year 1 (+1.54%), before falling below unshocked values; thus, investment rises much less than in the baseline RBC model. The rise in consumption is due to the presence of collateral-constrained households, who have a high propensity to consume out of their increased current income.
In the New Keynesian policy model, the rise in government purchases has a strong stimulative effect on GDP in year 1 (+1.36%), but output falls thereafter (Table 3 , Panel B).
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Note that aggregate consumption rises in year 1, due to the presence of collateral constrained consumers. We again find that eliminating the bank capital constraint dampens considerably the stimulative effect of the bank support measure, while hardly modifying the effects of the government purchases shock (not shown in Table) .
VI. Conclusion
Government support for the banking system can have a strong positive effect on real activity.
State bank aid multipliers are in the same range as conventional fiscal spending multipliers.
Bank support has a positive effect on investment, while a rise in government purchases crowds out investment. 4 The government purchases multiplier here is at the upper end of the multipliers generated by policy models; see Coenen et al. (2012) . 
